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ANN B.

HOPKINS

V.
PRICE WATERHOUSE ,
APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(Civil Action No. 84-03040)
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Theodore B. Olson, with whom Eldon Olson was on the
brief, for appellant. Wayne A. Schrader also entered an
appearance for appellant.
James H. Heller, with whom Douglas B. Huron was on
the brief, for appellee.
Susan L.P. Starr was on the brief for amicus curiae
urging that the District Court's decision be affirmed.
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. The
court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of time.
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Before: MIKVA,
Judges.

EDWARDS and HENDERSON,

Circuit

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.
Concurri ng opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

-~
. -,
._

.,

.

,·:.. .

.

',

.

,1l?~~,t,1i

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: This case, before this court
for the second time, arises from a decision by appellan t
Price Waterho use to deny partnersh ip to one of its
employees, appellee Ann B. Hopkins. We are again asked
to review a finding by the District Court that Price Waterhouse's denial of partners hip to Ms. Hopkins violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C .
§§ 2000e et seq. (1988), and to assess its shaping of an
appropri ate remedy.
In Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), the
Supreme Court clearly establish ed that "partner ship consideratio n may qualify as a term, condition, or privilege
of a person's employm ent" such that Title VII will provide
a cause of action if partners hip is denied because of sex
discrimin ation. Id. at 78 n.10. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimo us Court in Hishon, held that
even if . . . a partners hip invitatio n is not itself an
offer of employm ent, Title VII would nonethel ess
apply and preclude discrimin ation on the basis of sex.
The benefit a plaintiff is denied need not be
employm ent to fall within Title VII's protectio n; it
need only be a term, condition, or privilege of
employm ent.... Accordingly, nothing in the change
in status that advancem ent to partners hip might
entail means that partnersh ip consider ation falls outside the terms of the statute.
Id. at 77 (emphas is in original).
It is undisput ed that, for professio nal employees like
Ms. Hopkins , Price Waterho use held out the prospect of
admissio n to partners hip as a privilege of employm ent.
Indeed, the District Court expressly found that
"[p] artnersh ip consider ation was clearly a privilege of
plaintiff' s employm ent." See Hopkins v. Pr-ice Waterhouse,
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618 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd in part
and rev'd and remanded in part, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
Moreover, decisions concerning admission to partnership
were to be based exclusively on merit, taking into account
a range of job-related considerations - "from practice
development and technical expertise to interpersonal
skills and participation in civic activities." Id. at 1112. The
trial court found, however, that Ann Hopkins was denied
partnership at Price Waterhouse in part because of sexual
stereotyping, which is a form of sex discrimination under
Title VII. See id. at 1119-20. We upheld that finding, see
825 F.2d at 468, as did the Supreme Court, see 109 S. Ct.
at 1791, 1793 (plurality opinion); id. at 1802, 1805
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
The Supreme Court, while agreeing that Price Waterhouse had been motivated in part by discriminatory
stereotyping, remanded the case for reconsideration of
Price Waterhouse's claim that the decision to deny partnership to Ms. Hopkins would have remained the same
even in the absence of the proscribed discrimination. During the first trial before the District Court, Price Waterhouse was given an opportunity to show that it would
have reached the same decision regarding Ms. Hopkins
even absent any discrimination; however, both the trial
court and this court required Price Waterhouse to make
this showing by clear and convincing evidence. In reversing on this point, the Supreme Court ruled that the District Court must determine whether, on the record before
it, Price Waterhouse had shown by a preponderance of the
evidence, that it would have denied partnership to Ms.
Hopkins in any event for nondiscriminatory reasons. The
Supreme Court thus remanded for reconsideration on this
limited issue.
On remand, the District Court first offered to permit
Price Waterhouse to introduce new evidence concerning
nondiscriminatory reasons justifying the denial of partnership to Ms. Hopkins; Price Waterhouse declined this
offer, choosing instead to rely on the evidence already
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intr odu ced at the firs t tria l. The tria
l cou rt the n reviewed
tha t evi den ce and fou nd tha t Pri
ce Wa terh ous e failed to
car ry the bur den pla ced upo n it
by the Sup rem e Cou rt.
See Ho pki ns v. Price Waterhous
e, 737 F. Sup p. 1202
(D.D.C. 1990). Hav ing fou nd app ella
nt liable und er Tit le
VII, the Dis tric t Cou rt ord ere d Pri
ce Wa terh ous e to adm it
An n Ho pki ns into the firm 's par tne
rsh ip and to pay her
$371,000 in bac k pay . On this app
eal, Pri ce Wa terh ous e
cha llen ges bot h the Dis tric t Cou rt's
find ing of liability and
its rem edi al ord er tha t Ms. Ho pki
ns be ma de a par tne r.
We can find no me rit in eith er of
the se challenges.
Pri ce Wa terh ous e's arg um ent tha
t Tit le VII does not
aut hor ize a cou rt to ord er elev atio
n to par tne rsh ip res ts
ulti ma tely upo n the unt ena ble sug
ges tion tha t His hon
con ferr ed onl y a cau se of acti on
for the disc rim ina tory
den ial of par tne rsh ip and nev er me
ant to imp ly a cor respo ndi ng rem edy . We find it inconc
eivable, however, tha t
the Sup rem e Co urt inte nde d to ope
n up a par tne rsh ip's
adm issi on dec isio ns to judicial scr utin
y while placing the m
bey ond effective judicial remedy
. On this poi nt, it is
imp ort ant to not e tha t this case inv
olves only an employee's elevation to par tne rsh ip; it doe
s not involve a par ty's
rete ntio n of par tne rsh ip or the reg
ula tion of the rela tion shi p am ong par tne rs. Thu s, we are
not con fro nte d by the
con cer ns exp res sed in Jus tice Pow
ell' s con cur ring opi nio n
in Hishon, in wh ich he em pha size
d tha t the Cou rt in
His hon did not rea ch the que stio
n wh eth er Tit le VII
wou ld pro tec t employees afte r the
y bec
467 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring am e par tne rs, see
); we emphasize the
sam e poi nt tod ay, for we have no
occasion to decide this
que stio n.
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Fin din g no err or in eith er the tria l
cou rt's finding of liabili ty or in its sha pin g of an app
rop riat e remedy, we
affirm the jud gm ent of the Dis tric
t Cou rt.

I.

BACKGROUND

An n Ho pki ns join ed Pric e Wa terh
ous e in 1978, as a
me mb er of the pro fess ion al staf f
in the firm's Office of
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Gove rnme nt Services ("OGS") in Wash ingto n, D.C.
In
this posit ion, Ms. Hopk ins was responsible for helpi ng
the
firm to win and carry out mana geme nt cons ultin g
contract s with federal agencies. She enjoyed a succe
ssful
caree r in OGS and, in 1982, was prop osed for partn ershi
p.
In keep ing with the firm' s estab lishe d perso nnel proce
dures , all partn ers who had work ed with Ms. Hopk
ins
were aske d to subm it writt en comm ents to the
firm' s
Adm issio ns Com mitte e. Thes e evalu ation s were writt
en
on so-called "long forms" by those partn ers who knew
Ms.
Hopk ins well, and on "sho rt forms" by those who had
had
only passi ng conta ct with her. The evalu ation s cove
red a
range of consi derat ions, inclu ding both techn ical
skills
and perso nal inter actio ns. The Admissions Com mitte
e
was then responsible for sorti ng throu gh these form
s,
summ arizi ng the vario us comm ents, and subm itting
recomm enda tions to the firm' s Policy Board. The Polic
y
Boar d, in turn, was to decide whet her to rejec t the cand
idate outri ght, "hold " her cand idacy for anoth er year
or
subm it the cand idate for a vote by the full partn ershi
p.
See 618 F. Supp. at 1111-12 (reco untin g partn ershi
p
review process).
Ms. Hopk ins' recor d at the firm docu ment ed outst anding acco mpli shme nts as a senio r manager. At the
first
trial in this case, the Distr ict Cour t found that Ms.
Hopkins "play ed a key role in Price Wate rhou se's succe
ssful
effor t to win a multi -mill ion dolla r contr act with
the
Depa rtme nt of State ." Id. at 1112. Moreover,
[s]he had no difficulty deali ng with clien ts and her
clien ts appe ar to have been very pleas ed with her
work. None of the othe r partn ershi p cand idate s at
Price Wate rhou se that year had a comp arabl e recor d
in term s of successfully secur ing majo r contr acts for
the partn ershi p. . . . She was generally viewed as a
highly comp etent proje ct leade r who work ed long
hours , push ed vigorously to meet deadlines and
dema nded much from the multidisciplinary staffs
with which she work ed.
Id. at 1112-13.
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A number of the comments submitted by partners, however, also criticized Ms. Hopkins' "interpers onal skills,"
suggesting that she was sometimes overbearin g and abrasive. Some of these comments went further in suggesting
that these defects were especially inappropri ate because
Hopkins was a woman. As the Supreme Court noted in
its review of this case:
One partner described her as "macho"; another suggested that she "overcomp ensated for being a
woman"; a third advised her to take "a course at
charm school." Several partners criticized her use of
profanity; in response, one partner suggested that
those partners objected to her swearing only "because
it[']s a lady using foul language." Another supporter
explained that Hopkins "ha[ d] matured from a
tough-talk ing somewhat masculine hard-nose d mgr
to an authoritati ve, formidable, but much more
appealing lady ptr candidate. "
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1782 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
In March 1983, Price Waterhous e's Policy Board voted
not to admit Ms. Hopkins as a partner. Rather than dismiss her outright, however, the Board decided to "hold"
her candidacy , with the possibility that she might be
reconsider ed the following year. "When [Hopkins] consulted with the head partner at OGS, who was her strongest supporter and responsible for telling her what
problems the Policy Board had identified with her candidacy, she was advised to walk ·more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair sty'led, and wear jewelry." 618 F. Supp. at 1117 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
Ms. Hopkins remained at Price Waterhous e but then
ran into conflicts with some of the partners. Donald Epelbaum, one of the · partners in appellee's home office,
accused Ms. Hopkins of misreprese nting a conversati on
she had had with Price Waterhous e's managing partner
concerning her partnershi p prospects. 737 F. Supp. at
1212-13. These conflicts culminated in a decision not to
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repropose Ms. Hopkins for partnership the following year.
Ms. Hopkins then resigned and later brought this suit.
Following the first trial in 1985, the District Court held
that Ms. Hopkins had proved that sex stereotyping had
infected the decisionmaking process among Price Waterhouse's partners and that Price Waterhouse could avoid
equitable relief only if it could show, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have reached the same negative decision regarding Ms. Hopkins' candidacy even
absent the sex stereotyping. See 618 F. Supp. at 1120. The
trial court went on, however, to hold that Price Waterhouse's subsequent decision not to renominate Ms. Hopkins was nondiscriminator y, id. at 1115, and that Ms.
Hopkins' resignation was not a constructive discharge, id.
at 1121. Consequently, the trial court held that Ms. Hopkins was not entitled to back pay for the period following
her resignation. Id.
On appeal, a panel of this court found "ample support
in. the record for the District Court's finding that the partnership selection process at Price Waterhouse was impermissibly infected by stereotypical attitudes towards female
candidates." 825 F.2d at 468. We also held, contrary to
the trial court, that a showing by Price Waterhouse, by
clear and convincing evidence, that it would have deferred
Ms. Hopkins' candidacy regardless of her sex would result
in Price Waterhouse avoiding Title VII liability altogether, not simply equitable relief. See 825 F.2d at 471-72.
Finally, this court held that, on the record before the trial
court, Ms. Hopkins was constructively discharged when
Price Waterhouse informed her that she would not be
renominated; as a result, we held that any remedy to
which Ms. Hopkins was entitled should cover the period
following her resignation. Id. at 472-73. This court then
remanded the case to the District Court to fashion an
appropriate remedy. Id. at 473.
Following our initial review of this case, the Supreme
Court granted .certiorari and considered the case. The
Court upheld the District Court's finding that sex discrim-
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ination had tainted Price Waterhouse's decisionmaking.
See 109 S. Ct. at 1791, 1793 (plurality opinion); id. at
1802, 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). It
agreed that "a number of the partners' comments showed
sex stereotyping at work," see id. at 1791 (plurality opinion), and stated forcefully that "we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming
or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated
with their group," id. The Court then ruled that Price
Waterhouse could avoid liability if it could show - by a
preponderance of the evidence - that it would have
reached the same decision absent any discrimination, see
id. at 1792 (plurality opinion); id. at 1796 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Because the District Court
had not evaluated the evidence by that standard, the
Court remanded the case for reconsideration pursuant to
the proper evidentiary standard. Id. at 1793 (plurality
opinion).
On remand, Judge Gesell offered to allow either side to
introduce new evidence on the question of liability, but
both parties elected to have the District Court rule on the
basis of the evidence already in the record from the first
trial. 737 F. Supp. at 1204. Judge Gesell then ruled that
he was not persuaded, even by a preponderance of the evidence, that Price Waterhouse would have denied Ms.
Hopkins' candidacy for partnership in 1983 had Hopkins
not been a woman and that Price Waterhouse was therefore liable under Title VII. Id. at 1206-07. In fashioning
a remedy, Judge Gesell held that he was bound, by the
law of the case doctrine and the law of the circuit, to find
that Ms. Hopkins had been constructively discharged by
Price Waterhouse. Id. at 1208. Based in part on that finding, he then ordered that Ms. Hopkins be awarded
$371,175 in back pay (an amount that reflected reductions
on grounds of equity and inadequate mitigation), attorneys fees and a partnership in Price Waterhouse. Id. at
1209-17.
Price Waterhouse now presses five arguments on
appeal. It argues (1) that the District Court clearly erred
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in finding that Price Waterhouse did not meet its burden
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have deferred Ms. Hopkins' candidacy for partnership even if it had not considered Ms. Hopkins' gender;
(2) that the District Court misapplied the law of the case
doctrine in holding that Ms. Hopkins was constructively
discharged; (3) that the District Court had no power to
order partnership as a Title VII remedy; (4) that, even if
the court had this remedial authority, ordering a partnership was inequitable on the facts of this case; and (5) that
the District Court erred in its calculation of the back pay
to which Ms. Hopkins is entitled. We find no merit in any
of these contentions. Finding no error in the District
Court's judgment, we affirm.

IL

ANALYSIS

A. Liability
Price Waterhouse raises two objections to the District
Court's finding of liability. First, it asserts that the trial
court did not carry out the Supreme Court's instruction
that it reevaluate the evidence pursuant to the preponderance standard. Specifically, Price Waterhouse asserts that
the trial court sidestepped its responsibility to reweigh the
evidence by emphasizing Price Waterhouse's failure to
produce new evidence suggesting that it was moved by
legitimate, nondiscriminatory concerns in denying Ms.
Hopkins partnership in March 1983. Second, it asserts
that, even if the trial court did reweigh the evidence, it
committed clear error in not being persuaded by Price
Waterhouse's showing. We disagree on both counts.
As to Price Waterhouse's first contention, a fair reading
of Judge Gesell's opinion shows that he did in fact
"reweigh" the evidence and that he simply found it
unpersuasive.1 Judge Gesell based his finding that appel1

Judge Gesell prefaced his factfinding as follows: "[T]he Court,
after reviewing the transcript of the original trial and considering
the briefs and arguments of counsel, reaches the following findings
of fact and conclusions of law .... " 737 F. Supp. at 1204 (emphasis added).
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lant did not carry its burden of persua sion in part on
Price Water house' s failure to differe ntiate betwee n evaluations of Ms. Hopki ns that were "tainte d by sexism" and
those that reflect ed legitimate, nondis crimin atory concerns. See 737 F. Supp. at 1206-07. This finding could
hardly have come as a surpris e to Price Waterh ouse. The
earlier judicia l opinio ns in this case put Price Waterh ouse
on notice that it was virtual ly impossible on the basis of
the origina l trial record to discern the extent to which sex
stereot yping had pervad ed Price Waterh ouse's evalua tions
of Ms. Hopki ns. See 618 F. Supp. at 1117 (noting that
plainti ff's "well qualified expert " "did not purpor t to be
able to determ ine whethe r or not any particu lar reactio n
[to Hopkin s] was determ ined by the operat ion of sex
stereot ypes") ; 825 F.2d at 464 ("The trial judge acknowledged that it was impossible to measu re the precise role
sexual stereot yping had played .. . . "). Thus, when the
case return ed to the trial court on reman d from the
Suprem e Court, Price Waterh ouse had reason to know
that, based on the evidence it had proffer ed so far, the
trial court was likely unable to separa te out the impermissible reason s for appella nt's employ ment decision in order
to see if the reason s that remain ed would have led to the
same result.
Price Waterh ouse might have helped to tip the balanc e
in its favor by introdu cing its own expert testim ony or by
offering some more objective evidence in suppor t of its
case. Cf. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1791 ("[I]n most cases, the
employ er should -be able to presen t some objective evidence as to its ·probab le decision in the absenc e of an
imperm issible motive.") (footno te omitte d). Noneth eless,
Price Waterh ouse declined the opport unity to presen t new
evidence and chose to rest its case on the evidence previously submi tted - evidence that the trial court found left
the issue of liability, at best, in equipoise. See 737 F. Supp.
at 1206.
The approa ch taken by Judge Gesell appear s perfectly
consis tent with the instruc tions he received from the
Suprem e Court. The Court's plurali ty opinio n expressly
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acknowled ged the possibility that a court, unable to separate the permissibl e from impermiss ible motivation s of an
employer, would hold against the employer. Drawing an
analogy to the Court's treatment of mixed-mot ive cases
under the National Labor Relations Act, the opinion
noted:
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It is fair that [the employer] bear the risk that the
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the risk and
because the risk was created not by innocent activity
but by his own wrongdoing.
109 S. Ct. at 1790 (quoting NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983)) .
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the Court's judgment,
made clear that she, too, believed that it was the employer
who must carry the burden of separating out the impermissible motives from the permissible, and that the decision must go to the employee should the employer fail to
c~rry this burden:
The employer need not isolate the sole cause for the
decision, rather it must demonstra te that with the
illegitimate factor removed from the calculus, sufficient
business reasons would have induced it to take the
same employme nt action .... If the employer fails to
carry this burden, the factfinder is justified in concluding that the decision was made "because of' consideration of the illegitimate factor and the
substantiv e standard for liability under the statute is
satisfied.

t·
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109 S. Ct. at 1804 (O'Connor , J ., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
Judge Gesell, on remand, effectively invited Price
Waterhou se to identify and "remove[ ] from the calculus"
those partnershi p evaluation s that were influenced by illegitimate motivation s so that the court could then assess
whether the remaining legitimate reasons would have led
to the same employme nt decision. Price Waterhous e
declined the invitation, sticking instead to a view that
.-.-\·~.·\.(].
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every facially neutral evaluation was legitimate. See 737
F. Supp. at 1207; see also Brief for Appellant at 15-17;
Appellant's Reply Brief at 2-3. Since the reliability of that
evidence already had been properly called into question, 2
and since Judge Gesell found himself unable to separate
out the illegitimate motives from ·the legitimate, he was
therefore left unpersuaded, even by a preponderance of
the evidence, that Price Waterhouse would have made the
same employment decision absent discrimination. 3

--.~,.:-.

2

See, e.g., 109 S. Ct. at 1783 (noting that Hopkins' expert witness suggested that sex stereotyping infected "not only . . . the
overtly sex-based comments of partners but also ... [facially]
gender-neutral remarks").
3
As one commentator has aptly noted:
Obviously, in cases such as Hopkins, in which the legitimate reason articulated by the employer was of such a subjective nature as to itself invite stereotyping, the employer bears
the additional burden of showing that the stereotyped attitudes did not so pervade the subjective evaluation as to
destroy the articulated reason's tegitimacy. In cases in which
such subjective factors as "interpersonal skills" are offered as
the determining cause for the negative employment decision,
Justice Brennan's mandate in Hopkins that "the employer
should be able to present some objective evidence as to its
probable decision in the absence of an impermissible motive"
should be adopted.
Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 533 (1990) (quoting
Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1791; emphasis added by author; footnote
omitted).
Justice White suggested in his opinion concurring in the judgment in Hopkins that the employer need not produce objective
evidence but may rely on its own "credibl[e]" testimony about its
legitimate motivations, see 109 S. Ct. at 1796 (White, J., concurring in the judgment), a position the plurality found "baffling," see
id. at 1791 n.14. However, even under the view espoused by Justice White, we can find no merit in appellant's position: Judge
Gesell found that, on balance, Price Waterhouse's evidence was
not sufficiently credible to satisfy its burden of persuasion. We
cannot possibly say that this finding is ."clearly erroneous." See
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 290 (1982). When Price
Waterhouse declined to introduce any new, more objective evidence to resolve the lingering uncertainty, the District Court had
no grounds to rule against appellee.
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As Justic e O'Con nor freely acknowledged, the result in
a case of this sort may be "stron g medicine," see 109 S.
Ct. at 1797 (O'Co nnor, J., concu rring in the judgm ent),
but it is the price that emplo yers must pay "in cases such
as this one where the emplo yer has create d uncer tainty
as to causa tion by knowingly giving substa ntial weight to
an imper missib le criteri on," id. at 1796. There fore, we
reject Price Water house 's conten tion that Judge Gesell
failed to "weigh" the evidence. Judge Gesell expres sly did
review the trial record, see 737 F. Supp. at 1204, found
that it left "unce rtaint y on the point now at issue," see
id. at 1206, and, Price Water house havin g declined the
oppor tunity to add to the record or clarify the uncer tainty , resolv ed that doubt agains t the employer. That is
precisely what Judge Gesell was instru cted to do.
This leaves only Price Water house 's altern ative argument that Judge Gesell "failed to give sufficient weigh t to
Price Water house 's evidence" in his recons iderat ion. Brief
for Appel lant at 15. To the exten t that Price Water house
invite s us to make our own de novo determ inatio n of the .
facts, we decline. We review Judge Gesell's findings concernin g Price Water house 's motiv ations mindf ul of the
Supre me Court 's instru ction that they should be set aside
only if they rise to the level of clear error. See Pullm anStand ard v. Swint , 456 U.S. 273, 290 (1982). Under this
standa rd, we can upset Judge Gesell's conclusion that
Price Water house failed to prove that it would have
deferr ed Ms. Hopki ns' candid acy for partne rship in 1983
regard less of her sex only if that conclusion " 'is based on
an utterl y implausible accou nt of the evidence.' "
Underwood v. Distri ct of Columbia Armor y Bd., 816 F.2d
769, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Bisho pp v. Distri ct of
Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1986)); see also
Ander son v. City of Bessem er City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74
(1985) . Here, we find no such flaw. To the contra ry, Judge
Gesell's factfinding reflected balance, delibe ration and a
consid eratio n of the complete record. There fore, we affirm
the Distri ct Court 's finding of liability.
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B. Find ing of Constructive Discharge
We find no erro r in Judg e Gesell's finding that
Ms.
Hop kins was cons truct ively disch arge d when Price
Wat erhous e info rmed her that she would not be reno
mina ted
for partn ersh ip. See 737 F. Supp . at 1208-09. Price
Wat erhous e claim s that the Dist rict Cou rt misa pplie
d the law
of the case doct rine in adhe ring to this cour t's earli
er ruling on the cons truct ive discharge ques tion beca
use, following the Supr eme Cou rt's reve rsal on the
sepa rate
liability issue, this cour t vaca ted its earli er "man date
." See
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, No. 85-6052 (D.C. Cir.
Aug.
1, 1989) (available on Wes tlaw at 1989 WL 1053
18). Price
Wat erho use argu es that, by vaca ting its "man date
," this
cour t vaca ted its earli er opinion, inclu ding the unap
peal ed
ques tion of cons truct ive discharge .
We agre e with the Dist rict Cou rt that Price Wate
rhou se
is mist aken in asse rting an iden tity betw een
our 1987
opin ion and the man date it cont ained . See 737
F. Supp .
at 1207-08. Furt herm ore, it is sufficient to poin t
out that
the Dist rict Cou rt grou nded its finding of cons truct
ive dischar ge both in the law of the case doct rine and in
the fact
that this cour t's earli er cons truct ive discharge rulin
g has
since beco me the estab lishe d law of the circuit.
See
id. at
1208.4 Thu s, even if the trial cour t had not been
boun d
by the law of the case, it was none thele ss boun
d by the
law of the circuit. Und er thes e circu msta nces ,
we find
that, quite aside from the law of the case doct
rine, the
Dist rict Cou rt acted prop erly in adop ting this cour
t's earlier hold ing on cons truct ive discharge. 5
4The Distr ict Cour t point ed out that six cases
in
have adop ted the const ructiv e discharge rule set out this circu it
in this court 's
1987 Hopk ins opini on. See 737 F. Supp . at 1208 n.7
(listing cases).
Judg e Gesell then noted: "If the unap peale d findin
gs by the Cour t
of Appe als[] reflect a legal stand ard for purpo ses
of other cases,
surel y this Cour t is boun d to comply." Id. at 1208.
We agree.
5
See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625,
646 n.10
(1979) (Powell, J ., dissenting) (" Although a decis
ion vacat ing a
judgm ent necessarily preve nts the opini on of the
lower court from
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C.

Partnership as a Remedy Under Title VII

Price Waterhouse also asserts that the District Court
had no authority to order admission to partnership to
remedy a Title VII violation. Price Waterhouse's argument is apparently that while Title VII extends far
enough to protect an employee against discrimination in
partnership consideration, it comes to an abrupt halt once
a violation has been found, leaving the employee with the
promise of fair consideration for partnership but no effective means of enforcing it. This argument seems absurd
in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), in which the Court
held that "nothing in the change in status that advancement to partnership might entail means that partnership
consideration falls outside the terms of [Title VII]." Id.
at 77. Given the Court's judgment in Hishon, and after
careful review of Title VII, its legislative history and the
case law interpreting it, we find that the District Court
clearly acted within the bounds of the remedial authority
conferred by the statute.
1.

The Terms of Title VII and its Legislative History

The remedial reach of Title VII is defined broadly in
section 706(g) of the statute:

If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful employment practice
.. . the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which
may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or
hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or
being the law of the case, the expressions of the court below on
the merits, if not reversed, will continue to have precedential
weight and, until contrary authority is decided, are likely to be
viewed as persuasive authority if not the governing law ....") (citations omitted); Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,
870 F.2d 1292, 1298-99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 81
(1989); Hill v. Western Electric Co., 672 F.2d 381, 388 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981 (1982) .
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oany othe r equi table relie f as the cour t deem s appr
priat e.
expa n42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). By its choice of such
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cour
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sive statu tory language, auth orizi
ress
Cong
te,"
opria
appr
such affirmative action as may be
that
tion
inten
coul d hard ly have mad e more plain its
tive equicour ts exer cise broa d discr etion in craft ing effec6
table reme dies for emp loym ent discr imin ation .
unm isThe statu te's legislative histo ry reinf orce s this
of the
sis
taka ble conc lusio n. A secti on-b y-sec tion analy
1964
1972 ame ndm ents to the Civil Righ ts Act of
by
)
706(g
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flexi
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ble .... [T]he scope of relief ... is intended to make
the victims of unlawful discrimination whole ... [and]
so far as possible, [restore them] to a position where
they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.

. . ,, -., -...

-\:

r.:•.

'

;. :,1..,

118 CoNG. REC. 7168 (1972). The Supreme Court has
found in this language "emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empowered to fashion such relief as the
particular circumstances of a case may require to effect
restitution, making whole insofar as possible the victims
of . . . discrimination in hiring." Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976) (footnote omitted);
see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 42021 (1975) (finding that this history "strongly reaffirmed
the 'make whole' purpose of Title VII") .7 .

,. ·

2.

The Case Law Construing the Remedial Authority of
the Courts Under Title VII

Every indication from the case law suggests that section
706(g) is to be construed so as to authorize the courts to
grant "make whole" relief to victims of unlawful discrimination. As the Court noted in Albemarle Paper:
It is ... the purpose of Title VII to make persons
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination. This is shown by the
very fact that Congress took care to arm the courts
7

.

Congress' broad remedial intentions are similarly reflected in
the portion of the 1972 amendments vesting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") with administrative
enforcement powers. The Senate report explaining that provision
noted:

· . •

-{~e;"'.:;•.,,,::;:-...
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It is the committee's view that this authority be broadly
construed with the view toward completely rooting out and
eliminating employment discrimination. The Commission is
to take whatever affirmative steps are needed to provide a full
and complete remedy to the aggrieved party or class and to
obtain full and immediate compliance with the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1971) .
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with full equitable powers. For it is the historic purpose of equity to "secur[e] complete justice," Brown
v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503 (1836); see also Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397-398 (1946).
"[W]here federally protected rights have been
invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to
grant the necessary relief." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
684 (1946).
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422 U.S. at 418; see also Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153,
156 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (emphasizing importance of flexible,
complete relief under Title VII). The obvious point here
is that, to the fullest extent possible, Title VII authorizes
courts to put a victim of discrimination in the position
that she or he would have been in but for the unlawful
discrimination. That is exactly what the District Court did
in this case.

In crafting a remedy under Title VII, a court must first,
of course, identify the precise injury caused by the discrimination and then shape a remedy that will, as much
as possible, erase that injury. See Albemarle Paper, 422
U.S. at 418 (" 'The general rule is, that when a wrong has
been done, and the law gives a remedy, the compensation
shall be equal to the injury. The latter is the standard by
which the former is to be measured.' ") (quoting Wicker
v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867); original capitalization restored). In the context of this case, Judge
Gesell's finding of liability rested upon his conclusion that
Ms. Hopkins would have been made a Price Waterhouse
partner in March 1983 were it not for the invidious influence of sex stereotyping in the firm's decisionmaking.
Therefore, it is apparent that an invitation to join the
Price · Waterhouse partnership would be "the most complete relief possible" and in fact the only possible relief
that would restore Ann Hopkins to "the situation [s]he
would have occupied if the wrong .had not been
committed." Id. at 419 (quoting Wicker, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
at 99). 8
8
Price Waterhouse is simply wrong when it asserts, rather inexplicably, that "ordering that an employee be transformed into a
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3.

The Hishon Decision

As we have noted above, the Supreme Court in Hishon
has already decided that Title VII does intrude into a
partnership's admission decisions if it can be shown that
a denial of partnership was based on prohibited discrimination. Indeed, the Supreme Court was unanimous in
rejecting the view that "partnership" was beyond the
reach of Title VII:
RP-spondent contends that advancement to partnership 1.uay never qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of employment for purposes of Title VII. First,
respondent asserts that elevation to partnership
entails a change in status from an "employee" to an
"employer." However, even if respondent is correct
that a partnership invitation is not itself an offer of
employment, Title VII would nonetheless apply and
preclude discrimination on the basis of sex. The benefit a plaintiff is denied need not be employment to fall
within Title VII's protection; it need only be a term,
condition, or privilege of employment. It is als.o of no
consequence that employment as an associate necessarily ends when an associate becomes a partner. A
benefit need not accrue before a person's employment
is completed to be a term, condition, or privilege of
that employment relationship. Pension benefits, for
example, qualify as terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment even though they are received only after
employment terminates. Accordingly, nothing in the
change in status that advancement to partnership
might entail means that partnership consideration
falls outside the terms of the statute .
text of this case, even if monetary relief could be crafted with precision, it may nonetheless fall short of fully compensating
Hopkins for the opportunity she was denied by Price Waterhouse.
See 737 F. Supp. at 1211; see also Note, Tenure and Partnership
as Title VII Remedies, 94 HARV. L. R.Ev. 457, 465-66 (1980) (discussing inability of monetary damages to compensate for lost
prestige and career continuity and its inadequacy in fully deterring
"deep-pocket" defendants) .
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Second, respondent argues that Title VII categorically exempts partnership decisions from scrutiny.
However, respondent points to nothing in the statute
or the legislative history that would support such a
per se exemption. When Congress wanted to grant an
employer complete immunity, it expressly did so.
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Third, respondent argues that application of Title
VII in this case would infringe constitutional rights
of expression or association. Although we have recognized that the activities of lawyers may make a
"distinctive contribution . . . to the ideas and beliefs
of our society," respondent has not shown how its
ability to fulfill such a function would be inhibited by
a requirement that it consider petitioner for partnership on her merits. Moreover, as we have held in
another context, "[i]nvidious private discrimination
may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom
of association protected by the First Amendment, but
it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional
protections." There is no constitutional right, for
example, to discriminate in the selection of who may
attend a private school or join a labor union.
467 U.S. at 77-78 (citations and footnotes omitted;
emphasis in original).
In light of the Court's holdings in Hislwn, the answer
to the question whether Title VII will afford a complete
remedy once it is found that admission to partnership has
been denied due to prohibited discrimination seems selfevident. In fact, it would be impossible to reconcile a
denial of this remedial authority with the Court's
resounding affirmation in Hislwn that Title VII promises
employees nondiscriminatory consideration for partnership where consideration is held out as a privilege of
employment. The mere fact that elevation to partnership
may place the beneficiary beyond Title VII's protective
reach 10 in no way proves that Title VII is powerless to ele-

°We note - without reaching the question ourselves - that
some courts have held that partners are not "employees" under
Title VII and that discrimination directed against partners is
1
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vate a victim of discriminatio n to that position in the first
place. This is precisely the point that was made by Chief
Justice Burger for a unanimous Court in Hishon. 11
. therefore beyond the reach of the statute. See Wheeler v. Burdman, 825 F.2~ 257 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987);
EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984);
Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977); cf. Hyland v.
New Haven Radiology Associates, P.C., 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.
1986). We recognize, however, that a woman in Hopkins' position
may find protection under the statute should she be admitted to
the partnership on unequal terms or suffer retaliation upon
becoming a partner based upon her previous assertion of Title VII
rights. Under such conditions, the admission to partnership may
amount to a subterfuge for discriminating against an employee
and the victim of discrimination arguably would remain protected
by the statute. Cf. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Of course, an employer may not evade the strictures of
Title VII simply by labeling its employees as 'partners.' ");
Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 261, 277 (holding partners are not
"employees" under Title VII, but distinguishing the case where an
employee might be made a partner as "a sham" to enable subsequent discrimination ).
11
Furthermore, the remedial power of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") - which the Supreme Court has consulted
regularly in construing the reach of Title VIl's section 706(g) has been construed to include the power to elevate an unlawfully
discharged worker to a position that is itself beyond the scope of
the NLRA. In Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers lnt'l Union v.
NLRB, 547 F.2d 575, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom.
Angle v. NLRB, 431 U.S. 966 (1977), this court held that, under
the NLRA, "an employee who is illegally discharged and who, but
for that discharge, would have been promoted to a supervisory
position" must be "reinstated to [that] supervisory ·position," even
though the NLRA does not itself protect supervisory employees.
See also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 187-89
(1973) (illegally discharged employee who would have been made
an independent contractor but for the discharge may be reinstated
as an independent contractor under the NLRA, even though that
status would take employee outside the Act's protections). Thus,
the mere fact that Title VII might not regulate relationships
among partners does not refute the statute's power to elevate an
employee to partnership as a remedy for a clear statutory violation.
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It is, of course, true, as Justice Powell noted in his concurrence to Hishon, that a partnership rel,ationship is
"markedly" different from the relationship of an employer
and employee. See 467 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J ., concurring).
But this consideration is not controlling in this case. The
instant case involves only an employee's elevation to partnership; it does not involve Ms. Hopkins' retention of
partnership or the regulation of the relationship among
partners at Price Waterhouse. Thus, we are not confronted by the concerns expressed in Justice Powell's concurring opinion. Justice Powell emphasized that the Court
in Hishon did not reach the question whether Title VII
protects employees after they become partners; nor do we
reach that question in this case.
4.
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The EEOC's Position

It is also noteworthy that the EEOC, the agency to
which we owe deference in construing Title VII, see EEOC
v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988),
agrees with our construction of the remedial reach of Title
VII. This is significant because Congress has recognized
"the importance of administrative expertise relating to the
resolution of problems of employment discrimination." S .
REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1971). In explaining
Congress' decision to grant the EEOC administrative
enforcement powers, the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare observed that "[m]any of the Title .VII
proceedings involve complex labor relations and business
operations issues particul,arly in the fashioning of the remedies for eliminating discrimination. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission would be expected to
develop an important reservoir of expertise in these matters, expertise which would not readily be available to a ·
widespread court system." Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added).
The EEOC has applied its expertise to the question
before us and has concluded that Title VII authorizes
court-ordered elevation to partnership as a remedy for the
discriminatory denial of partnership. See Brief of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus
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Curiae at 18-23. The EEOC's view reinforces our own
independent reading of the statute. See Lander, 888 F.2d
at 157 (taking note of EEOC position in construing remedial reach of Title VII).
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All of the foregoing consideration s lead us to conclude
that the ordering of a partnership is consonant with the
broad remedial goals of Title VII and with" '[t]he general
rule . . . that when a wrong has been done, and the law
gives a remedy, the compensatio n shall be equal to the
injury.'" Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418 (quoting Wicker
v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867)).
D. Constitutional, Contractual and Equitable Considerations
Although all signposts in the statute, its legislative history and the case law point strongly toward affirming the
District Court's judgment to order partnership, thereby
vindicating "[t]he 'make whole' purpose of Title VII," id.
at 419, Price Waterhouse urges that there are several
countervailin g consideration s weighing against this conclusion. We consider them in turn.
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Conclusion on Partnership as a Remedy Under Title
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Freedom of Association

Price Waterhouse argues that a court order forcing it
to accept Ann Hopkins as a partner would violate its partners' constitutiona l rights of free association. This argument is entirely unpersuasive . Even assuming arguendo
that a large business partnership such as Price Waterhouse has cognizable associational rights, they must yield
to the compelling national interest in eradicating discrimination. See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary
Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987)
("Even if [the forced admission of women members] does
work some slight infringement on Rotary members' right
of expressive association, that infringement is justified
because it serves the State's compelling interest in elimi-
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nating discrimination against women."); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976).
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It is difficult to differentiate between the constitutional
argument Price Waterhouse advances here and the one
rejected in a nearly identical setting in Hishon. There,
King & Spalding, a large law partnership, had similarly
insisted that "application of Title VII in [its] case would
of expression or
infringe constitutional rights
association." 467 U.S. at 78. The Supreme Court brushed
aside the argument, noting that "'[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising
freedom of association protected by the First Amendment,
but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional
protections.'" Id. (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455, 470 (1973)) .
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Principl,es of Contract Law

Price Waterhouse also points out that courts have traditionally been reluctant to order the creation of a partnership as an equitable remedy for breach of contract, and
urges that this contract principle be carried over into the
realm of antidiscrimination law. It is true that in common
law contract cases the courts have hesitated to compel
persons to work together or to enforce other ongoing
human relationships, including partnerships. But this
contract principle is not grounded in the peculiar nature
of partnerships but rather extends to all "personal
service" contracts, see Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661, 668 (1st Cir. 1984), including simple employment relationships. Thus, citing the same
principle, courts have refused to order employers to reinstate employees as a remedy for the breach of an employment contract. See, e.g., Zannis v. Lake Shore Radiowgists,
Ltd., 73 Ill. App. 3d 901, 392 N.E.2d 126, 128-29 (1979);
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On the basis of the foregoing authorities, we reject
Price Waterhouse's suggestion that its claimed freedom of
association precludes the court from ordering partnership
as a Title VII remedy.
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Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 177 Md. 248, 254-56, 9 A.2d
639,
641-42 (1939); Spru nt v. Members of the Bd. of Trust
ees
of the Univ . of Tenn ., 223 Tenn . 210, 443 S.W.2d 464,
466
(1969) .
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Title VII make s expre ssly clear, however, that this common law rule does not limit a cour t's power to fashi
equit able remedies for empl oyme nt discr imina tion in on
violatio n of the statu te. Price Wate rhou se concedes,
as it
must , that the "plai n langu age" of Title VII conte mpla
judic ial autho rity to orde r reins tatem ent and hirin tes
g of
employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). Thus ,
even
unde r appe llant 's analysis, it is plain that there
is
meri t to the argum ent that comm on law principles of no
contract law serve to limit Title VII's remedial reach. 12
3. The Equities of this Case
Lastl y, Price Wate rhou se argue s that even if the District Cour t was empo were d unde r Title VII to order
partnersh ip as a remedy, it was an abuse of discretion for
the
cour t to do so on the facts of this case. Specifically, appe
lant argue s that Ms. Hopk ins' own alleged misc ondu lct13
12
Moreover, even in the conte xt of tradit ional contr
"[t]he re is a subst antial body of autho rity that endor act law,
ses specific
perfo rmanc e when breac h by the employer would under
mine an
impo rtant public intere st. Specific perfo rmanc e may
be
order ed
to remed y civil-rights violations .... " E . YORIO
,
CONTR
ACT
ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTION
S
at 381 (1989). Comm entato rs have also suggested that § 14.4.1.3,
availability of reinst ateme nt under statut ory schem the rising
es
Title VII has led to an erosion of the tradit ional contrsuch as
upon which Price Wate rhous e relies. See J. CALAM act rule
ARI & J.
PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 16-5, at 667-68 (3d ed. 1987)
("In view of
these developments, the reaso ns behin d the tradit ional
bar again st
a court decree ordering an employer to perfo rm are quest
ionable.")
(footn ote omitt ed).
1
3The Distri ct Court found that Ms. Hopk ins had
the subst ance of a meeting . .. betwe en herse lf and Josep"miss tated
h E. Connor, the Chair man and Senio r Partn er of Price
Wate
rhous e,
regard ing her partn ership prosp ects. Ms. Hopk ins
misle
impli ed that Mr. Conn or had dispa raged certai n partn adingly
ers who
oppos ed her candidacy and that he had warne d of
the adver se
conse quenc es his partn ers migh t experience for oppos
ing her the
next year." 737 F. Supp. at 1213 .
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following the March 1983 decision to defer her candidacy
made her eventual elevation to partnershi p impossible
and precludes the court from now making Ms. Hopkins
a partner. We do not agree .
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The misconduc t to which Price Waterhous e refers
occurred only after Price Waterhous e's own illegal sex
discrimina tion had intervened to deny Ms. Hopkins her
place in the partnershi p. Given the findings of sex discriminatio n committed by appellant's partners, there is a
certain hint of irony in the moral indignatio n with which
Price Waterhous e protests the prospect of having to offer
partnershi p to a person who allegedly misstated the substance of a conversation. We also note that Price Waterhouse does not claim that, if Ms. Hopkins had been
admitted to partnershi p in March 1983, her subsequen t
alleged misconduc t would have justified her dismissal
from partnershi p.
Yet, with these observatio ns aside, we find that the District Court expressly considered Ms. Hopkins' alleged
misconduc t in the shaping of its equitable remedy, deducting from her back pay award any "claim for the fiscal year
1983-1984." 737 F. Supp. at 1213. We review this judgment under the highly deferentia l abuse-of-discretion
standard, see Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 424, and, on
the record before us, we can find no basis to overturn the
. trial court's decision. For us to reject the District Court's
judgment on this issue would be a flagrant disregard of
the obvious limits of the abuse-of-discretion standard.
Judge Gesell not only limited back pay, he was careful
to consider · whether there existed too much hostility
between the parties to permit an effective working relationship; he found there did not. See 737 F; Supp. at 1210. ·
He also considered alternative remedies, such as front
pay, and concluded that it would be impossible to tailor
a prospective remedy so that Ms. Hopkins truly would be
made whole. Id. at 1211. Finally, he considered and
rejected Price Waterhous e's contention that Ms. Hopkins
is entitled only to reconsider ation for partnershi p by Price
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Wat erho use, finding that orde ring reco nsid
erat ion in this
case would be "fut ile and unju st." Id. at
1210 -11; see also
id. at 1209 n.9. We find no abus e of disc
retion by Judg e
Gesell in orde ring a part ners hip base d on
the facts of the
case befo re him .
E. Calculation of Bac k Pay
Finally, we find no erro r or abuse of disc
retio n in the
Dist rict Cou rt's calc ulat ion of Ms. Hop
kins ' back pay
awa rd. In part icul ar, we find that Judg e
Gesell prop erly
acco unte d for Ms. Hop kins ' inad equ ate miti
gati on in formul atin g the award.
The miti gati on requ irem ent of Titl e VII
provides that
"[i]n terim earn ings or amo unts earnable
with reasonable
diligence by the pers on or pers ons disc rimi
nate
shal l ope rate to reduce the back pay otherwis d agai nst
e allowable."
42 U.S .C. § 2000e-5{g) (1988) (emphasis
added). Thi s is
precisely the form ula Judg e Gesell appl ied:
he first foun d
that Ms. Hop kins ' max imu m earn ing pote
ntia l following
her dep artu re from Pric e Wat erho use
i.e., the
"am oun t[ ]' earn able with reas ona ble diligence
" in her case
-wa s $100,000 per year, and he then redu
ced her back
pay awa rd by that amo unt. 737 F. Supp.
at 1215.
The fact that cou rts have som etim es deni
ed back pay
alto geth er to Titl e VII plaintiffs who coul
d have foun d
wor k but declined to do so, see, e.g., Sangste
r u. United Air
Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980
), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 971 (1981), is irrel evan t. Judg e Ges
ell foun d that
Ms. Hop kins could not have foun d a job
with pay equ al
to wha t she would have earn ed as a Pric
e Wat erho use
part ner. See 737 F. Sup p. at 1215. Tha t fact
dist ingu ishe s
her case from othe rs whe re plaintiffs faile
d to seek jobs
that would have com pen sate d them com
pletely for thei r
losses and elec ted inst ead to rem ain unem
ployed. See, e.g.,
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (198
2) (plaintiffs
forf eite d back pay afte r refu sing emp loye r's
unc ond ition al
offer to rein stat e them to the jobs from
which they had
been fired); Ford v. Nicks, 866 F.2d 865,
874 (6th Cir.
1989) {plaintiff forfeited claim to back pay
afte r refu sing

·,_.
I
· <

"·f

I
I

.

·,

...'

.

•

~: ...

~\- ·:
:::-.- .-.

t · .::
-- ·~'-

..

,

.

··-·· •,.s

:.' •·{

29
·.

., ~

,i,. ..

...

- ..

,-! - ·

.

.. :f•:~~ . fi:~:
;,N,+••I-?

job that "pai d slightly more" than job she
was disc rimi natoril y deni ed); cf. Donnelly u. Yellow Frei
ght System, Inc.,
874 F.2d 402, 411 (7th Cir. 1989) (to cut
off back pay liability, the emp loye r mus t show "tha t with
the exercise of
reas ona ble diligence ther e was a reas ona
ble chan ce the
emp loye e mig ht have foun d com para ble
emp loym ent, the
earnings of whic h would offset any damages
awarded") (empha sis add ed), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 1566 (199
0). Whi le it is
true that the tria l judg e foun d that Ms.
Hop kins coul d
hav e earn ed mor e than she did upo n leav
ing Pric e Wat erhou se, he prop erly took that fact into acco
unt by redu cing
her bac k pay awa rd by the "am oun t[] earn
able with reasona ble diligence." See Ens or v. Painter,
661 F. Sup p. 21,
24 (E.D. Ten n. 1987) ("[T ]he Cou rt find
s that plai ntif f
Ens or has mai ntai ned a lower sala ry at
her subs equ ent
emp loym ent for near ly two year s with out
evidence of having soug ht a high er-s alar ied position. The
refo re, the Cou rt
finds that . . . her awa rd of back pay shou
ld be adju sted
accordingly."). On this record, we can find
no reas on to
dist urb the Dist rict Cou rt's calc ulat ion of
back pay.

III.
;·;,

... .

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reas ons, the judg
men t of the
Dist rict Cou rt is affirmed.

So ordered.
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HENDERSON, Circuit
Judge, concurring:
I co nc ur in th e m aj
or ity 's decision bu t
on ly be ca us e th e
na rr ow scope of ou
r review compels af
firmance . Th e distri ct co ur t fo un d as
a fa ct th at th e deci
sion to de fe r consid er at io n of H op
ki ns 's pa rtn er sh ip
ca nd id ac y was a
pr od uc t of in te nt io
na l di sc rim in at io n.
W hi
finding as hi gh ly qu
es tio na bl e, in lig ht of le I view th at
w he lm in g ev id en ce
th e al l bu t overth at th e decision re
su lte d from H op ki ns 's own, w el l-a
tte
ca nn ot sa y it is "b as st ed pe rs on al ity deficiencies,1 I
ed on an ut te rly im
pl au si bl e ac co un t
1

·.

·.··--· ;.

.

..;-..
., .~

..

'

Ho pk in s's difficult
es tab lis he d in th e re y in working wi th ot he r employees is
cle
co
as se ss me nt s of Pr ic e rd an d was repeatedly cit ed in th e wr arly
itt en
W
ate
rh
ou
se
pa rtn er s as th e re as
ag ain st pa rtn er sh ip .
on for vo tin g
Se
e
J
.A
.
37
-45
.
As
th e di str ict co ur t ex
found:
pressly
Du rin g th e review
Admissions Co m m itt of Ms. Ho pk in s' ca nd id ac y by th
e
was considerable re ee it was ap pa re nt th at , alt ho ug h th er
e
sp
ec
t
for he r abilities an
ac hi ev em en t an d a
d record of
br ou gh t to th e firm recognition of th e be ne fit s sh e ha
d
, sh e ra nk ed very
in ter re lat io ns . Ev en
low on he r pe rso na
l
so
me
pa rtn er s who
wi th he r wo rk an d
were strongly urgin were m os t familiar
g th e Co mm itt ee an
Bo ar d to re co m m en
d
d
th e firm co m m en te he r for pa rtn er sh ip in th e in ter es ts of
d po in ted ly on he r
in ab ili ty to ge t along
wi th sta ff an d pa rtn
er s.
737 F. Su pp . at 1205
.
wi th whom sh e wo ill us tra tiv e of Ho pk in s's tre at m en t of
rk ed ar e th e followi
th os e
ng
tel ep ho ne co nv er sa
tio n wi th a fellow incidents: (1) du rin g a
"s cr ea me d obscenities
employee, Ho pk
of th em for up to 45 to hi m , four let ter words, co nt in uo us str in s
ea m
th e ch ief pa rtn er in mi nu tes ," J.A. 76; (2) du rin g a lu nc h
wi
he
th
r
se
cti
on
an
d
an ot
tee re d a lengthy an
d "vitriolic" critique he r pa rtn er , sh e volunof he r co-workers, "g
th ro ug h th e en tir e
pr
oin
a re ad -o ut on th e dif of es sio na l sta ff in ou r office an d giving g
fic
us
ult
ies
th
at
th e people ex po se d
experienced wi th th em
or sh e ha d .
or
th
at
sh
e
vie
we
d th em ," J.A. 80; (3)
viewing :Q1Sterials pr
wh
od
ha d co nt ra cte d wi th uc ed by an outside graphics co nt ra ct or ile
Pr ic e W ate rh ou se fo
who
cized his work, "exp
r
ress[ing] he rse lf fairly years, Ho pk in s so cr iti wa rd called a se ni or
directly," th at he af
m
ter W ate rh ou se account, an ag er fearful he was going to lose th e
Pr
J.A
ice
.
14
1;
an d (4) at
sh e received, Ho pk in
s, gr atu ito us ly it ap th e to p of a flow ch ar t
pears, wr ot e a perso
an d obscene, re m ar
k ab ou t a fellow em
nal,
ployee, J.A. 140.
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of the evidence" so as to warran t reversal of the district
court's decision . See Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788
F.2d 781, 785-86 (1986); see also Anderson v. Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) ("If the district court's
account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record
viewed in its entirety , the court of appeals may not
reverse it even though convinc ed that had it been sitting
as trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence
differently."). For this reason, I am constra ined to concur
in affirming the district court's conclusion on liability.
I also concur, but even more reluctan tly, in affirming
the award of a partner ship interest under the circumstances here. While I agree with the majorit y that the
plain language of section 706(g) of title VII, togethe r with
its legislative history and interpre ting case law, make it
clear that partner ship is a permissible remedy under title
VII, I am convinc ed that this extraor dinary equitab le remedy should be dispens ed only under limited circums tances
when justice so dictates . Partner ship is a relation ship
requirin g trust and coopera tion among the individu al
partner s. As Justice Powell observed in Hishon, this relationship "differs marked ly . from that between employ er
and employee," the former "contem plat[ing ] that decisions importa nt to the partner ship normall y will be made
by commo n agreem ent . . . or consent among the
partner s." 467 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurr ing); 2 see
also Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 273 (10th
Cir.) (partne rships "embod y very special relation ships and
sensitiv e manage ment concern s inter se"), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 986 (1987). Further , the partner ship relation ship
imposes on each partner mutual liability for the misconduct of each other partner . See J. Crane & A. Brombe rg,
Law of Partnership § 58 (1968). For these reasons , courts
should exercise great caution in awardin g the remedy of ·
partner ship to avoid excessive intrusio n on or disrupti on
of the often delicate partner ship relation ship. In my view,
Hopkin s's conduc t toward other employees and partner s
2

Justice Powell was speaking of law partners hips in particula r
but his reasoning applies equally to an accounting partners hip .
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both before 3 and, partic ularly , after her candid acy
deferm ent4 casts great doubt on her ability to functi on
effectively with the other Price Water house partne rs.
Never theles s, I canno t say that under these circum stance s
the distric t court abuse d its discre tion in award ing Hopkins a partne rship intere st.
As the distric t court noted , Price Water house , which
has over 900 partne rs in appro ximat ely 90 locati ons
throug hout the countr y, "lacks the intima cy and interd epende nce of smalle r partne rships ." 737 F. Supp. at 1210.
For that reason , it is far less likely than many smalle r and
more cohesive partne rships to suffer seriou s disrup tion if
forced to accep t a partn er of Hopki ns's dispos ition. Further, assum ing, as we must in light of the distric t court' s
factua l findings, that Hopk ins was the victim of gende r
discri minat ion, she is entitle d to compe nsatio n of some
sort and the available remed ies are limited. While I am
loath to rewar d Hopk ins's condu ct with an award of part-
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See supra note 1.
4The distric t court made an expres s finding that during the year
following deferm ent of her partne rship candid acy Hopki ns
engaged in "unrea sonabl e intenti onal conduct" by substa ntially
misrep resenti ng to Donald Epelba um, a partne r in her section,
a
conver sation she had with the chairm an and senior partne r,
Joseph E. Conno r. 737 F. Supp. at 1212-13. Relying on "strong
"
evidence in the record, the distric t court found that Hopki ns
"misst ated" the substa nce of her conver sation with Conno r and
"misleadingly implied that Mr. Conno r had dispara ged certain
partne rs who opposed her candid acy and that he had warned of
advers e consequences his partne rs might experience by opposi ng
her candidacy." 737 F. Supp. at 1213. Because of that inciden t,
Epelba um withdrew his previously strong suppor t of Hopkin s's
partne rship candidacy. Nor was that the first time Hopkin s acted
with someth ing less than full candor to partne rs in the firm. In
1980, she represe nted to anothe r partne r that a project had been
comple ted "within budget" when, in fact, there was a $35,000 discrepan cy which she acknowledged only after persist ent questio ning. J.A. 40. In light of the facts in the record, I, unlike the
majori ty, find no irony in Price Waterh ouse's reluctance to accept
as partne r an individual whose history so strongly suggests she
cannot be trusted .
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unr estr icte d fro nt pay
ner ship , the alte rna tive remedy of
as the dis tric t cou rt
is eve n less sati sfac tory and ,
nt, "m igh t well provide
observed, wit h considerable res trai
F. Sup p. at 1211.
a wholly unw arr ant ed windfall." 737
btfu l tha t the judgBas ed on the ent ire record, I am dou
just ice. Nevertheless,
me nt of the dis tric t cou rt achieves
at sho rt of "a definite
bec aus e my ske ptic ism falls som ewh bee n committed,"5
has
and firm con vic tion tha t a mis tak e
jori ty's affirmance of
ma
the
in
I am req uire d to con cur
tha t jud gm ent .
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Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
See United States v. United Stat es may be reversed as clearly
rt
395 (1948) (A finding of the tria l cou
evidence to sup por t it, the
is
e
ther
h
oug
erroneous "when alth
is left with the definite and
reviewing cou rt on the entire evidence n committed.").
bee
has
firm conviction that a mistake
5
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